Muchnik on Kant's account of evil

I went to Pablo Muchnik's (Sienna College) talk on Kant's account of evil this week at Gordon College. From what I gather, an evil agent, according to Kant, has to not only will from an evil maxim, but have a large selection of such maxims at his disposal--has to have an evil character. What makes Madoff evil, for instance, is not just him setting up a Ponzi scheme, but his continued maintenance and deception, which suggests his evil character.

Assuming that all this deception, etc. was willfully chosen (the only grounds for moral responsibility for Kant), I feel contempt for this man. I see him as a less-than-human being. But this is just to deny his willful choice and thus his moral responsibility, says Kant. So, I'm in a pickle. If I feel contempt, Madoff is not morally responsible, as moral judgments are inadmissible for non-moral beings. It's not at all clear to me *what* the appropriate reaction to Madoff is. Perhaps the Kantian would respond that it is my duty to forgive. So be it. But I can't will myself to do this even if it is my duty.