Moral Animals and Moral Relativism

Francis Beckwith argues in "Why I'm not a Moral Relativist" that there are only three sources of objective morality: illusion (i.e. there isn't objective morality), chance, and intelligence. I like this argument. However, what if our biological and social evolution plays a central role in our acquisition of moral principles? I'm not sure we can put evolution as a moral source in the "chance" category as under such an explanation morality would arise in response to social conditions and is the natural result of a social species.

Just to press this point, take a social species like wolf/dog. They have moral rules that have evolved through their social interaction and need to survive. As Bekoff and Pierce argue, there are dog "commandments" much like Moses' decalogue that help wolf/dog society to function. If wolf/dogs have moral principles (along with other social organisms) much like our own, then I'm further inclined to think that "chance" is a poor category for evolutionary explanations of morality.

Might intelligence have bestowed morality to wolf/dogs and us humans? I'm inclined to think that there are simpler ways to explain this: that the process which led to our biology also led to our morality. So, what category might evolutionary explanations of morality fit if not chance (and not intelligence)? Perhaps a category of "mechanistic process" might better describe such explanations, showing Beckwith's argument to be, at bottom, a false dilemma.

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More Virtual Reality Ethics

Once again the new virtual reality world called Second Life ignites a flurry of ethical quandaries. Patrick Davidson's talk at Ignite (http://ignite.oreilly.com/2009/12/patrick-davison-and-the-plight-of-the-digital-chickens.html) about virtual chicken farming raises some interesting issues relating to virtual property ownership and anonymous social interactions. The main thrust of his talk, however, is that different people perceive the function of virtual spaces differently, and this difference in perception leads to conflict.

When dealing with digital ethics, it is important to keep in mind the different ways of perceiving digital reality. To some it is a new way of being, to others it is merely a tool, to others still it is just a game. When conflicts of digital ethics arise, it is often the case, but rarely noticed, that the conflict stems from a fundamentally different view of digital reality.

The Ethics of Avatar

My paper about our confused intuitions on moral status of virtual avatars is up in the latest edition of Stillpoint Magazine.

A reader just emailed me asking about the moral dimensions of avatar use explored by James Cameron in his engaging movie Avatar. In this film an other-world tribe of native humanoids, the Na'vi, adopt an "avatar" (what the Na'vi call a "dream walker") of a paraplegic marine named Jake Sully into their culture.

Sully's avatar is a cyborg of sorts, a biologically engineered physical being. Hence, Sully's avatar is more akin to the cyborgs in Bruce Willis' film Surrogates than to digital-based avatars which exist on a digital plane of existence. Sully and his avatar are two bodies in the same "analogue" world, whereas a digital avatar inhabits a distinct world from their user. This small point has, I think, a large effect on our intuitions.

Sully's cyborg avatar is clearly just an extension of his body, and thus it is Sully himself who is adopted by the Na'vi people and who (spoiler alert!) marries the Na'vi princess. Even the princess recognizes this "extension" relationship, as evidenced by her care for his damaged human body.

What if, by contrast, the Na'vi and their world was portrayed in the movie as digital, a variant of Second Life? Would it be as obvious that Sully himself was adopted by the Na'vi people, etc? Not to me, anyway. It seems like involvement in the digital world, separate and unique to ours, brings about a deep confusion about the moral status of its creatures.

In sum, Cameron's film does not bring up the same confused intuitions on our moral status that Second Life does, but that isn't to say that there aren't other intriguing ethical questions to be drawn from the film.

Moral Responsibility of Involuntary Action

Christian Perring of Dowling College, who edits the helpful "Metapsychology Online Reviews" site, presented an interesting paper at Cambridge Hospital, MA last week about moral responsibility of addicts and others who may not have full control of their harmful actions.

The thrust of the argument was that addicts can be morally blameworthy for their harmful behaviors even if they were compelled by the addiction. The rationale was that the addict behaves in a way that he knows will cause harm. The relationship, then is damaged, and the person hurt feels blame towards the person who has acted harmfully. The addict, or the mentally ill person, is still blameworthy for their actions because 1) the person knew that the action would harm the other person and 2) they performed the action nonetheless.

The reaction to this conclusion was surprisingly receptive. However, as the issue was pushed, it seems that there was more of a gradient of blameworthiness. For instance, someone who performs a malicious act purely for malice is very blameworthy. On the other end of the spectrum, the epileptic who happens to hit someone is not blameworthy at all, because he had no intention of performing the action.