Moral Animals and Moral Relativism

Francis Beckwith argues in "Why I'm not a Moral Relativist" that there are only three sources of objective morality: illusion (i.e. there isn't objective morality), chance, and intelligence. I like this argument. However, what if our biological and social evolution plays a central role in our acquisition of moral principles? I'm not sure we can put evolution as a moral source in the "chance" category as under such an explanation morality would arise in response to social conditions and is the natural result of a social species.

Just to press this point, take a social species like wolf/dog. They have moral rules that have evolved through their social interaction and need to survive. As Bekoff and Pierce argue, there are dog "commandments" much like Moses' decalogue that help wolf/dog society to function. If wolf/dogs have moral principles (along with other social organisms) much like our own, then I'm further inclined to think that "chance" is a poor category for evolutionary explanations of morality.

Might intelligence have bestowed morality to wolf/dogs and us humans? I'm inclined to think that there are simpler ways to explain this: that the process which led to our biology also led to our morality. So, what category might evolutionary explanations of morality fit if not chance (and not intelligence)? Perhaps a category of "mechanistic process" might better describe such explanations, showing Beckwith's argument to be, at bottom, a false dilemma.

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Ten Elshof on Self-Deception

I'm wrapping a book review on Gregg Ten Elshof's book I Told Me So. Gregg is the chair of the philosophy department at Biola and a fellow student of Dallas Willard. Like Dallas, he is using his talent and training as a philosopher to provide some insight into the Christian life.

Anyway, here's the way I like to demonstrate the likelihood that YOU are self-deceived: Try this experiment. Write down three character traits that best represent you. Now, think of someone in your life who brings you displeasure, and write down three qualities that represent him or her. Would it surprise you to learn that the qualities you attributed to your rival, which were likely negative, are qualities that in reality best represent you? And furthermore, your self-attributed qualities, which were likely positive, are in actuality better attributions of your rival.

If this experiment worked on you (it devastates me), things get worse. It turns out, as Gregg argues, that our belief attributions are even likely deceived, like "the belief of the saving power of Christ" Christians like to attribute to themselves. The communal and emotional atmospheres of evangelistic rallies provide the perfect conditions for self-deception, and this is where many acquire their Christian beliefs. These beliefs are maintained in similar environments found at many church services.

What to do? Gregg is a little short shrift on this. I'm inclined to say that it is high-time for Christians to stop isolating themselves from "non-believers" and take opposing criticism seriously. That's at least a step in the right direction.

Moral Responsibility of Involuntary Action

Christian Perring of Dowling College, who edits the helpful "Metapsychology Online Reviews" site, presented an interesting paper at Cambridge Hospital, MA last week about moral responsibility of addicts and others who may not have full control of their harmful actions.

The thrust of the argument was that addicts can be morally blameworthy for their harmful behaviors even if they were compelled by the addiction. The rationale was that the addict behaves in a way that he knows will cause harm. The relationship, then is damaged, and the person hurt feels blame towards the person who has acted harmfully. The addict, or the mentally ill person, is still blameworthy for their actions because 1) the person knew that the action would harm the other person and 2) they performed the action nonetheless.

The reaction to this conclusion was surprisingly receptive. However, as the issue was pushed, it seems that there was more of a gradient of blameworthiness. For instance, someone who performs a malicious act purely for malice is very blameworthy. On the other end of the spectrum, the epileptic who happens to hit someone is not blameworthy at all, because he had no intention of performing the action.